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CHAT has its limits.  It is a three-hour exercise.  However, the real world problems of healthcare rationing 
and priority-setting are too complex for a three-hour exercise.  What is needed, as a supplement, are sustained 
processes of rational democratic deliberation that can address the challenges to healthcare justice posed by 
costly emerging medical technologies, such as these targeted cancer therapies.
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The CHAT game is a lot of fun. It is engaging, thought-provoking, and thoughtfully designed. However, healthcare priority-setting is too complex for just a 
CHAT. In this commentary, my goal is to identify the limits 
of CHAT in order to make clear the need to move beyond 
CHAT. I will discuss three claims. First, in the real world, just 
healthcare rationing and priority-setting require sustained 
rational democratic deliberation about very complex, concrete 
trade-offs, not just abstract principles. Second, what I refer 
to as the “liberalism problem” also requires sustained public 
deliberation. That phrase refers to the question of whether 
socially controversial medical procedures, such as pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis, should be publicly funded. 
Third, our “sense of justice” is complex and very much 
context-dependent, which again requires sustained public 
deliberation to fashion a considered judgment of healthcare 
justice specific to some concrete rationing problem.
The CHAT game asks participants to set priorities among 
broad categories of healthcare interventions and values. To 
my mind, that has limited social value. Hurst et al report, 
for example, that 66% of participants endorsed “greater 
adherence to cost-effectiveness guidelines in chronic care.”1 
Given concerns about escalating healthcare costs, broad 
endorsement of that guideline is not surprising. However, most 
of the targeted cancer therapies and immunotherapies used to 
treat metastatic cancers are not cost-effective (using $100 000 
per quality-adjusted life year [QALY] as the threshold) nor do 
they yield clinically meaningful benefit (though we note that no 
public deliberative process or legislative policy in Switzerland 
has specifically endorsed any such number, whether higher or 
lower).2,3 On average, most of these targeted therapies yield 
survival gains measurable in months, not years, with costs 
ranging from $100 000 for a course of treatment to more than 
$500 000 (for CAR T-cell therapy for B-cell lymphoma).4 In 
one study only 13 of 37 of these targeted cancer therapies met 
the threshold of the European Society of Medical Oncology 
for clinically meaningful benefit.5 Should we conclude from 
that research that Swiss CHAT participants would give up 
socially funded access to all these cancer therapies that were 
not cost-effective and did not yield clinically meaningful 
benefit? This clearly needs to be known, at least as far as social 
policy is concerned. 
In the United Kingdom, the National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) is responsible for determining whether 
or not these targeted cancer therapies will be funded by the 
National Health Service (NHS), which has a fixed annual 
budget, unlike Switzerland and many other countries, 
including the United States. NICE uses cost-effectiveness 
analysis in their judgments, though that is not exclusively 
determinative. Consequently, many of these cancer therapies 
are included, but a substantial number are excluded as well. 
NICE is entirely independent of the British government, which 
gives it immunity from political pressure. However, political 
pressure did force the British government to create a Cancer 
Drugs Fund to provide access to those drugs not approved by 
NICE. Over the period 2010-2016 that fund expended £1.27 
billion for almost 100 000 cancer patients without gathering 
any data on outcomes for those patients (perhaps because the 
data would have been embarrassing and only confirm NICE’s 
original judgment).6 That political pressure is described as 
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being “populist” in origin, which might reflect something 
“democratic,” though unlikely “deliberatively democratic.” 
Perhaps a sustained deliberative process over weeks or 
months by a representative group of British citizens would 
have yielded the same outcome, though the discussion below 
provides reasons for thinking otherwise. 
Here are some concrete questions related to these cancer drugs 
that must be answered. Some patients with metastatic lung 
cancer might be taking one of these $100 000 cancer drugs 
for a year but gain only three additional months of life. That 
yields an incremental cost-effectiveness value of $400 000 per 
QALY. Is that a good or just use of limited social resources? 
Could other healthcare needs have been met that would have 
yielded more health good for more persons at a lower cost 
per QALY? Should we ignore that question because these lung 
cancer patients are faced with a terminal outcome in the near 
future? However, 80% of Swiss CHAT participants wanted to 
exclude from coverage “invasive life-sustaining measures in 
dying patients.” What should we imagine those participants 
regarded as the scope of that directive? Metastatic cancer is 
a terminal illness, though these patients are not imminently 
dying. Many of these cancer drugs are given by infusion. Is 
that “invasive enough” to invoke the above directive? 
A small percentage of these cancer patients are described as 
“super responders” to these drugs. They gain extra years of 
life, though each of those years will cost $100 000 or more. 
At present, physicians have no idea before the fact who 
those patients might be. That means treatment for the vast 
majority of these metastatic cancer patients will not be cost-
effective, though it would be cost-effective for the 3% or 5% 
who might be super responders. Given those facts, what is the 
just choice to make from a social policy perspective? Should 
all these cancer patients have assured access to these drugs, 
though not cost-effective, perhaps based on an expanded 
sense of compassion? Alternatively, should cost-effectiveness 
considerations exclude all those cancer patients, thereby 
sacrificing the many extra years of life that could be gained by 
the super responders? 
If this latter alternative seems harsh and insensitive, and 
if we consequently choose to provide these drugs to any 
cancer patients who might benefit to any degree, then what 
would morally justify restricting this expanded sense of 
just compassion to cancer patients alone? Would we not be 
equally ethically obligated to provide $250 000 left ventricular 
assist devices to patients in late-stage heart failure so that they 
might gain an extra year of life (sometimes more)? Likewise, 
if HIV patients have failed four-drug combinations that cost 
$35 000 per year, must we then provide them with the latest 
HIV drug that costs $118 000 per year?7 The list of chronic 
degenerative conditions in advanced stages that will result 
in death can be quite long, and will get longer with ongoing 
costly advances in medical technologies. Where should we 
draw the line? 
To further complicate matters, research is occurring aimed 
at identifying biomarkers for these targeted cancer therapies 
that will distinguish patients most likely to have a strong 
response to these therapies (gain more than a year of life) 
from those likely to have only a marginal response. Assuming 
such research is successful, would Swiss CHAT participants, 
having endorsed greater attention to cost-effectiveness, also 
endorse restricting access to these cancer therapies to the 
likely strong responders? However, Hurst et al reported that 
“more participants agreed that benefits should be the same 
for everyone,” as opposed to restricting that expectation 
only to “really essential benefits.” If benefits are “the same 
for everyone,” does that imply that effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness in relation to the clinical circumstances of 
individual patients are irrelevant? In other words, we would 
have to be willing to spend a $100 000 for an extra month of 
life or an extra year of life for the same therapy for the same 
cancer. Alternatively, should all of these advanced cancer 
therapies be regarded as being outside “really essential 
benefits,” the implication being that access to these therapies 
would depend upon individual ability to pay? However, that 
would appear to be a clear example of rationing, which 19% of 
CHAT participants say they would reject.
We can assume broad agreement with the proposition that 
the healthcare needs of cancer patients require a just and 
compassionate social response. As the discussion above 
indicates, translating that broad agreement into specific, 
costly, practical therapeutic choices is exceedingly complex 
(and not within the scope of what CHAT can accomplish). 
Adding to the complexity is the “liberalism problem.” A 
liberal, pluralistic society requires mutual respect for a broad 
diversity of reasonable values with diverse prioritizations 
among those values. What does that mean in practice when 
advocates for physician aid-in-dying request that this be a 
socially funded service available to metastatic cancer patients? 
Individuals with strong religious beliefs of a certain sort 
will vigorously object to paying taxes to support a practice 
they regard as profoundly morally objectionable. What 
does “mutual respect” require in that situation? Likewise, 
if a couple wishes to have children that are genetically their 
own, but they are both carriers of a cystic fibrosis mutation, 
they have the medical option of preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis (PGD), which has a cost of about $40 000 in the 
United States. The procedure itself involves the creation of 
multiple embryos grown in vitro to the 8-cell stage, when they 
would be genetically analyzed. Embryos free of some specific 
genetic mutation would be available for implantation; the 
rest would be discarded. Should access to PGD be socially 
funded for all future possible parents at risk of having a child 
with a genetic disorder that would very adversely affect the 
length of life or quality of life for that future possible child? 
This certainly seems like a worthy social objective, though 
again many individuals with specific religious commitments 
would vigorously object to paying taxes for a procedure to 
which they deeply conscientiously objected. What sort of 
social policy would reasonably respect the competing social 
values at stake in this situation? Medicine today is peppered 
with novel procedures and technologies that generate deep 
social divisiveness related to conflicting value commitments. 
A CHAT exercise cannot effectively address those social 
conflicts.
Philosophers tend to be advocates for one or another 
conception of justice: egalitarianism, utilitarianism, 
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prioritarianism, libertarianism, sufficientarianism, or luck 
egalitarianism. However, if we were to review a broad range of 
widely socially endorsed considered judgments of healthcare 
justice, we would find all of those conceptions of justice 
reflected therein. Everyone with pneumonia or an inflamed 
appendix at risk of bursting has a just claim to needed medical 
care. Both egalitarians and utilitarians readily endorse this 
claim because the needed care is costworthy and effective. 
It is also very basic, and hence, endorsed by sufficientarians. 
Prioritarians are concerned about the just claims to needed 
care for those who are least well off health-wise. Compassion 
motivates endorsing those prioritarian concerns, at least 
for very ill patients for whom there is a reasonable chance 
of medical success, even if very costly. Some patients need 
extraordinarily expensive care for which chances of medical 
success are very marginal. Consequently, there will be broad 
social agreement that it is not unjust to allow individual ability 
to pay to determine access to such care, as libertarians would 
argue. However, what does healthcare justice require when 
an individual with metastatic lung cancer related to smoking 
needs $500 000 worth of cancer treatment for an extra year of 
life? What if genetic aspects of that individual made him more 
susceptible to lung cancer, unbeknownst to himself? What if 
he tried multiple times to quit smoking with some years of 
success? Is that a justice-relevant consideration? What if he 
had Whole Genome Sequencing ten years earlier and was duly 
advised of his genetic vulnerability but continued to smoke? 
Is that fact justice-relevant? A just and compassionate social 
response to such complex circumstances cannot emerge from 
a CHAT exercise. 
The conclusion I wish to draw from all these questions is that 
a three-hour CHAT session cannot possibly yield thoughtful, 
stable, just agreement regarding the medically and morally 
complex issues identified above. This requires sustained 
rational democratic deliberation. For the interested reader I 
have written at length about what such a deliberative process 
must look like to be both just and legitimate.8 Space does not 
permit an extended description of that process. In general, 
when we have clear and widely shared agreement that a 
specific principle of justice yields a just rationing or allocation 
protocol, we have no need for a deliberative process. However, 
when there are conflicting or ambiguous intuitions of 
healthcare justice regarding novel therapeutic interventions, 
such as the targeted cancer therapies above, then we need 
a sustained fair process of democratic deliberation to 
construct a reasonable and “just enough” social response, 
what John Rawls refers to as “fair terms of cooperation.”9 
This is how we revise and construct public reason in a liberal, 
pluralistic, democratic society that must function with shared 
understandings of healthcare justice.
To conclude on a more positive note, the virtue of CHAT 
is that it can serve as an effective motivator for these more 
sustained processes of democratic deliberation. The Swiss 
have a well-entrenched process of direct democracy, which 
would be a useful basis for the deliberative practices endorsed 
in this essay. However, in my judgment, these deliberative 
practices in Switzerland (and elsewhere) would need to be 
mediated and legitimated by a NICE-like entity, as in the 
United Kingdom, to formulate and authorize detailed policies. 
As I hope I have suggested clearly, the rationing and priority-
setting decisions in healthcare today are too numerous and 
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